l. Introduction
Government subsidies for the cost of producing a number of goods and services have been criticized by economists on the grounds that they are "capital biased, " i. e., that the percentage rate of subsidy is greater for capital costs than for non-capital costs.
Provided that the elasticity of substitutio n between capital and other inputs in the production function is positive, capital-biased subsidies provide producers with an incentive to choose an inefficiently . high capital intensity because the capital intensity which will minimize private costs will exceed the capital intensity which will minimize social costs.
The excess social cost of the chosen capital intensity represents a waste of resources.
In some cases governments have instituted bureaucratic monitoring and approval procedures to limit the extent to which subsidi zed producers can respond to the incentive to increase capital intensity. This does not eliminate the inefficiency, because the monitoring costs could be avoided if the capital bias were removed. However, the monitoring costs may be less than the waste of resourc es that would occur if producers were free to minimize private costs given a capital biased subsidy.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate empirically the impact of a capital-biased subsidy program for which the government claims to have bureaucratic checks sufficient to prevent any distortion in capital intensity. I analyze the effect of Ontario, Canada provincial government subsidies on the scrapping of urban transit buses.
The results should be of interest to people concerned with the design of subsidy pr ograms and with bureau cratic behav ior.
Ontario Transit Subsidies 1
Urban transit services in Ontario are pr ovided mainly by firms owned by municipal g overnments and operated by quasi independent commissions. All systems began to receive operating subsidies from their municipal g overnments at some time during the decade preceding 1972. These municipal government subsidies do not concern us here because they did not pr ovide an incentive to change bus scrapping behav ior.
Since December 1972 the Ontari o pr ovincial g overnment has paid 75 percent of the c ost of purchasing urban transit buses.
The subsidy is paid on the difference between expenditures on new or used buses and revenues from the sale of used buses. 2
In addition, between 1971 and 1976 the pr ovince paid 50 percent of the operating losses of urban transit firms. Since 1977 the province has paid 13.5 to 25 percent (depending on urban area populati on) of the cost of non-capital inputs.
It is clear that since 1977 there has been a severe capital bias in prov incia -subsidies. It is hard t o be certain exactly h ow much capital bias there was between December 1972 and 1976, however. Municipalities paid the 50 percent of operating losses not covered by the province. If the municipal operating subsidy was a lump-sum grant, then the pr ovincial operating subsidy was a matching lump-sum grant; in this case, there was no subsidy for n on-capital c osts, and the capital bias was very severe. However, if the municipal subsidy was based on n on-capital costs, then the province effectively gave an equal subsidy for n on-capital costs; in this case, the capital bias was less. Still, since operating losses were always less than 75 percent of operating costs, the combined rate of provincial and municipal subsidies for n on capital costs was less than 75 percent, and there was s ome capital bias.
In sn ort, until the end of 1972 there was n o capital bias. Beginning in 1977 there was a severe capital bias.
Between December 1972 and 1976 there was a capital bias, which may have been s omewhat greater or less than the bias since
1977.
In order t o obtain the 75 percent subsidy for th€ c ost of buses, a transit system has t o obtain the approval of the prov incial ministry of transp ortati on bef ore placing an order for buses. The implications of this requirement for bureaucratic appr oval are imp ortant in this study and will be made clear shortly.
A Model of Bus Scrapping Behavior
In order to evaluate the effect of capital-biased subsidies, we begin with a model of bus scrapping behav ior which is similar to the model of aut om obile scrapping used by Pa rks (1977) .
Suppose that during each period a bus requires a number of units of maintenance an d repairs in order t o remain in operati on.
The amount of maintenance is assumed to be a random variable whose distributi on depends on the durability of the bus-type and the age of the vehicle. Durability may, for example, be different for gasoline and diesel buses and for different makes. Let M i (A) be the amount of maintenance required for a bus of type i and age A. We assume that the exp ected value of such maintenance increases with age, i.e.,
This assumption is supported by a study by Puccini (1979, Fig. 11) , which rep orts that f or a transit firm in Ontario in 1976 average maintenance costs per kil ometer increased by 0. 69 cents with each year of bus age.
The decis ion t o scrap a particular bus is assumed t o be ma de n ot on the basis of the expected value of M i but rather taking acc ount of the rea li zed value of M i . Letting C (t) be the cost per unit of maintenance in period t, a tra nsi t firm will scrap a bus if and onl y i f the realized maintenance cost C (t) M i (A) exceeds the difference between the value of an operable A year old bus of type i, P i (A, t) , and its scrap val ue, s i (A, t) .
Given f i (M i ;A) , the density functi on for M i , one can determine z i (A,t) , the c onditional pr obability that a bus which has survi ved t o age A will be scrapped at that age:
(1)
The pr obability of scrapping is an increasing function of bus age, of the cost per unit of maintenance, and of the scrap value of the bus and is a decreasing function of the value of an ope rable used bus.
Hypotheses
A "neutral"
Concerning the Ef f ects of Subsidies cost subsidy for urban transit which applies at the s ame percentage rate t o all c osts w ould n o t change the scrapping pr obabilities for buses, provided the supply of new buses and the demand for scrapped buses were perfectly elastic with respect to price. This is because it would not change the lower limit of integrati on in Equation (1) ab ove.
H owever, a capital-biased subsidy would reduce the l ower limit of integration and increase the probability of scrapping .
The prediction that a capital-biased subsidy would increase the pr obability of scrapping for buses has not previously been tested empirically. 3 H owever, two studies have used engineering data to simulate the effects of capital biased subsidies on the (expected) age at which urban transit vehicles would be scrapped. Tye (1969) If subsidies would be withheld, we predict that the same subsidy progra m would reduce the probability of scrapping for buses less than 15 years old and increase the probability of scrapping for buses 15 years old and older (assuming all buses scrapped are replaced, which is realistic during the period under study.)
Specification of the Econometric Model
In order to develop an econometric model for the purposes of estimation, we assume that the probit of the scrapping probability for a bus is a linear function of the relevant independent variables. The scrapping probability is, of course, unobservable. What we observe is whether or not a bus is scrapped. The variable S CRAP is defined to take a value of 1 if a bus is scrapped during a one-year period and 0 if it is not. The following independent variables were included in the analysis:
We in tially estimated probit equations for diesel and gasoline buses combined. In these equations we included a dummy variable, FUEL, for type of fuel {!=diesel, O=gasoline)
to allow for any difference in durability between buses using different fuels. We had no theoretical reason for expecting one type of bus to be more durable, but casual observation suggested that diesel road vehicles are more durable and hence that the sign of the coef ficient on FUEL would be negative. We had no theoretical reason to expect GM C buses to be more or less durable than others. The make variable was omitted when the sample was partitioned by make and fuel.
(c) AGE
The theoretical model outlined in Section 3 above yields the hypothesis that the probability of scrapping increases with age (measured here in years) . ( 2) proxy for expected future rates. The interactive form was used because the underlying hypothesis was in terms of a ratio .
(g ) POPULATION
One would expect that the probability of scrapping would depend not only on the age of a bus but also the number of
miles it has been driven. It seems plausible that the number of miles a bus is dr iven per year varies systematicaly with urban area population, for example because larger cities offer service more hours per week.
To allow for this, we included POPULATION, the population (in million of the area served by the transit system, as an independent variable. We would expect the coefficient on POPULATION to be positive. This effect would be reinforced during 1977-81 because the extent of capital bias in subsidy programs was positively correlated with the population of the urban area.
This is a result of the fact that the operating cost subsidy varied from 13.5 percent for large cities to 25 percent for small ones.
(h) Specifications
Thus, the initial specification of the model used for the full sample of data was: 5 F -l (z) = a 0 + a 1 FUEL + a 2 MAKE + a 3 AGE + a 4 Sl +a 7 WAGE + a a BUS-PRICE + a g iNTEREST +a 10 POPULATION + e
We also estimated this equation, without the terms a 1 FUEL and a 2 MAKE, for each of the four fuel-make bus types: GMC diesel, other diesel, GMC gasoline, and other gasoline. In addition, we estimated two alternative specifications for the full sample and for each of the four subsamples. First, we replaced a 4 s1 by (a 5 S2 + a 6 S3) . Second, we deleted the last four variables. Thus, we estimated a total of 15 equations.
The maximum likelihood estimates are presented in Table 1 .
Data
The Because this is a relatively homogeneous subsample which included a large number of observations for buses of all ages both before and after introduction of capital-biased subsidies, we place greates t weight on the estimates for GMC diesels. By contrast, we give virtually no weight to the estimates for other makes of gasoline buses because this sample included only two observations for buses between 9 and 22 years old during the period 1974-81. e significantly different from zero at 10 percent level, two tailed test, but sign opposite that predicted .
Empirical Results
In this section we discuss the maximum likelihood estimates which are presented in Table 1 . Thus, whatever specification problems underlie the mixed results for these four variables do not reduce our confidence in the other conclusions of this study. Because the estimates for these four variables do not appear sensible, we give greatest weight to the estimates which omit them (Equations 3, 6, 9, and 12) •
Conclusions
In an earlier study [Frankena (1982) ], I presented tabular data on the relative frequency of scrapping for GM C diesel, other diesel, and gasoline buses of various ages in four Ontario cities during 1963-72 and 1973-77. I concluded that "the data suggest that for gasoline and 'other diesel' buses thirteen years old and older the introduction of provincial capital-biased subsidies did lead to earlier scrapping and hence a waste of resources" (p. 137) . It must be added, however, that while the capital-biased subsidies had a statistically significant etfect on scrapping decisions, the extent to which scrapping decisions were distorted, and hence the waste of resources caused by the capital-biased natur e of the subsidies, were a good deal less than is sug gested by the si mulations carried out by Tye an d
Armour, ev en al lowi ng for the fact that the cap ital bias in the Ontario program was probably somewhat less than in the o.s. programs they considered.
An extensive theoretical and empirical literature demonstrates that there are significant potential efficiency gains from urban transit subsidies [Frankena (1982, Ch. 5) ].
This paper demonstrates that capital-biased cost subsidies are less efficient than neutral cost subsidies. The merits of neutral cost subsidies compared to lump-sum and passenger subsidies are considered elsewhere [Frankena (1981 [Frankena ( ) , (1983 ]. 
